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OCHA-IMO-P3-Istanbul, Turkiye (for oPt)

Istanbul, Turkiye
Position Title: Information Management Officer 
Receiving Agency: OCHA 
P Level: P3
Location: Istanbul, Türkiye 
Duration: Until March 31st, 2026
Language: Arabic and English required

Brief Description of Emergency
The landscape in the OPT has fundamentally changed since 7 October 2023. Decades of occupation, political instability, and isolation due to the Gaza blockade, barrier wall and movement restrictions had left the population heavily reliant on aid to meet basic needs. In both Gaza and the West Bank, the ability of Palestinians to access lifesaving services has dramatically decreased while protection concerns have exponentially increased. In the West Bank, the escalation of violence in 2025 has further deepened the humanitarian crisis, with increasing protection risks, movement restrictions, and mounting needs across affected communities. OCHA is supporting the coordination of the response, in particular with information management, coordination and analysis. OCHA is supporting the coordination of the response, in particular with information management coordination and analysis

Brief Surge Need Justification
The emergency in the West Bank has been steadily escalating since January 2025, placing growing pressure on humanitarian coordination and response. While OCHA has been providing support through its internal resources, additional capacity is urgently required to meet the increasing needs. Other OCHA offices will continue to provide surge and remote support as needed; however, the Country Office will also reassess staffing requirements and succession planning during the course of the SBP deployment to ensure sustained operational effectiveness.

OCHA's Role and Key Challenges
OCHA’s overall goal in oPt is to support the government to ensure the delivery of effective and principled humanitarian action that meets the needs of the most vulnerable people. To achieve this, OCHA supports the humanitarian partners in operational coordination, humanitarian financing, public information, humanitarian analysis, advocacy and information management.

Main Partners and Stakeholders in the Field: 
Government, UN Agencies and sectors.

Long-Term Plan after SBP Deployment Ends
The deployee will cover needs generated by the response and by the end of their deployment the country office will have finalized the process for hiring and training a national officer.

Will Other Surge Resources be Requested? 
Other SBP request for a different IM profile might be required but is currently being assessed.

Main Tasks and Duties to be Executed:
To provide advanced geospatial analysis and rapid mapping support for field operations, enabling data-driven decision-making through the management, visualization, and interpretation of spatial data. and applications.

Expected Outcome of the Deployment:
Enhanced Field Operational Capacity through timely access to critical spatial analysis, statistics, and maps. Improved Decision-Making driven by accurate, data-driven insights and advanced geospatial processing. Strengthened Reporting and Advocacy with high-quality, compelling visualizations and maps for internal and external communication. Streamlined Data Utilization
via well-managed, accessible spatial data and efficient geo-processing services.

Specific Required Skills:
Geospatial Data Management & Analysis Design and manage spatial databases and data collection tools; consolidate and validate operational data for analysis. Perform advanced spatial analysis (e.g., hotspot detection, proximity analysis) to support needs assessments, situational awareness, and strategic planning. GIS & Mapping Develop and maintain core spatial datasets and online mapping services in accordance with international standards. Produce high-quality, rapid-response map products and interactive dashboards for field offices and partners. Data Visualization & Reporting Develop clear, compelling data visualizations—including interactive charts, infographics, and reports—to convey complex information and support advocacy. Ensure all materials adhere to organizational branding guidelines.

Overall Security Situation: 
The domestic political climate in Türkiye and Istanbul, in particular, is shaped by a complex interplay of internal political tensions and regional geopolitical upheavals. The arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, the PKK’s announced disarmament and disbandment of the group, the Iran-Israel and the Gaza conflict, and the associated Türkiye’s position have all produced layered effects on national cohesion, public sentiment, and the ruling government’s strategies

Terrorism - The most recent terrorist attack in Istanbul occurred on February 2024 at the Çağlayan Courthouse (Istanbul Justice Palace). There are no known terrorist threats directed toward the UN and its personnel by terrorist groups operating in the Istanbul Security Area; however, the UNSMS personnel remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks against police/military forces, government installations, public places, places of worship and tourist locations in the metropolitan city.

Crime - Petty crimes such as theft, pickpocketing, break-ins, burglaries, taxi scams, and bag-snatching incidents are common in Istanbul. Most crime incidents affecting the UN personnel in the Istanbul Security Area are non-violent by nature. Typically, non-resident UN personnel on missions in Istanbul become targets of pickpocketing and bag snatching more frequently than the resident UN staff. Turkish security authorities are often effective in handling criminal incidents.

Civil Unrest - In the Istanbul Security Area, civil unrest incidents have historically been limited due to frequent bans imposed by Turkish authorities on public demonstrations and gatherings for security reasons. However, the political climate in 2025 has shifted significantly following the arrest of Istanbul’s Mayor in March, which triggered widespread protests across the city and beyond. The continuation of hostilities in Gaza has further fueled sentiment, leading to additional protests in Istanbul, particularly near diplomatic missions and symbolic public spaces. These events, though largely peaceful, carry a persistent risk of escalation, especially in the context of broader regional instability and domestic political sensitivities. While many of these gatherings have remained peaceful, isolated incidents of violence, clashes with law enforcement, and property damage have been reported. The government responded with temporary bans on public assembly and increased policing of urban centers.

Hazard - A major earthquake remains the foremost concern for UN personnel, their families, and UN operations within the Istanbul Security Area. The city’s proximity to the North Anatolian Fault (NAF)—a strike-slip fault where the Anatolian and Eurasian plates converge— places it at significant seismic risk. Historically, this fault has produced devastating earthquakes across Türkiye, and current geophysical assessments indicate that tectonic strain continues to accumulate along unbroken fault segments beneath the Marmara Sea. Seismologists warn that a severe earthquake, potentially ranging between 7.1 and 7.5 on the Richter Scale, could occur south of Istanbul. The Host Country’s emergency planning is based on a scenario involving a 7.5 magnitude earthquake; however, the actual intensity and impact cannot be precisely predicted. Given Istanbul’s population exceeding 16 million and its dense urban infrastructure, a powerful earthquake could overwhelm national emergency response capabilities. Such scenario necessitates robust internal contingency planning and self-sufficiency protocols. Flooding continues to be the second most destructive natural hazard in Türkiye, particularly affecting Istanbul and its surrounding areas. These events are primarily driven by intense and prolonged rainfall, which is increasingly frequent due to climate variability. In Istanbul, flood risks are exacerbated by the occupation of natural floodplains, extensive coverage of impervious surfaces, and insufficient drainage infrastructure. The Black Sea coastal districts and low-lying urban zones are especially vulnerable. Despite ongoing municipal efforts, the city’s stormwater systems and flood detention structures remain inadequate to manage large-scale flooding, often resulting in severe disruptions to transport, utilities, and public services.

Visa Requirements:
If the expert does not hold a UNLP but does not require a visa based on nationality, they may proceed with travel, and we will arrange the appropriate residence documentation upon entry. If the expert does not hold a UNLP and a visa is required based on nationality, the office will provide a support letter for the expert to request a visa at the local Turkish Embassy/Consulate. 




CANADEM and its partners have a no-tolerance policy for inaction to prevent, respond to and follow up on alleged cases of Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (SEAH). For this reason, we adhere to all policies, procedures and training of the United Nations on The Prevention of Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment (PSEAH). CANADEM mandates all deployees successfully complete the PSEA online course. This e-learning course is composed of a set of lessons designed to raise awareness about SEAH, become familiar with a range of measures to combat SEAH, understand the impact on victims and the consequences for UN Personnel who commit Sexual Exploitation, Abuse, and Harassment.

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